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China watchers were held rapt by the flurry of activities in the second week of 2011.
In its first official announcement of the year, the People’s Bank of China, the Beijing-headquartered central bank,
allowed further liberalisation (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/38eb67ca-1f08-11e0-b3ba-00144feab49a.html)of the use
of the renminbi overseas -- marking yet another incremental step in the deepening internationalisation of China’s
currency.
Earlier, Ai Weiwei (http://www.bbc.co.uk/go/rss/int/news/-/news/world-asia-pacific-12174873), a prominent artist,
hurried from Beijing to Shanghai. He was told that demolition crews – sent by local authorities – were knocking down
his Shanghai studio for allegedly flouting the city’s zoning laws. Interestingly, this issue did not exist between 2008
and July 2010, as the studio was being built with support of local officials. Ai could only surmise that the about-turn
was the result of his growing domestic and international profile as a dissident.
Moving inland into Chengdu, a Chinese-built fighter plane, supposedly with stealth capabilities, was seen sitting on a
runway open to public view. Just as international analysts dismissed the aircraft as an early prototype not yet ready
for a test flight, the “J-20” took to the sky (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12159571)– just in time
to welcome US Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ visit to China.
Three events, three locations, and according to the analysis of Harry Harding
(http://www.virginia.edu/uvatoday/newsRelease.php?id=7633), each of these three are manifestations of three
broad “tendencies” that shape China’s foreign policy today. The Dean and Professor of Public Policy and Politics,
Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, was speaking at a seminar held at
Singapore Management University's School of Social Sciences (http://www.socsc.smu.edu.sg/).
Harding, a scholar of US-China relations for more than three decades, was speaking on implications of scheduled
leadership changes that will take place next year in both these giants of the international arena. Come 2012,
President Barack Obama will be fighting for his second term as Republicans attempt to reclaim the White House.
Across the Pacific, Vice President Xi Jinping and his band of fifth generation leaders are waiting to take over from
President Hu Jintao's team.
Harding's premise was that because politics in China remains relatively opaque, it would be more fruitful to discuss
policy alternatives under consideration, than to identify the specific leaders and interest groups that are promoting
them. Each of the three incidents described earlier thus represents a different “tendency”: the incremental
relaxation over the use of the RMB is “integrative”; the demolishing of Ai’s studio “defensive” and the timing of J-20’s
very public test flight, “assertive”.
Integrative: Let’s work together; we are in the same boat
First up, the “integrative” tendency draws support from two main groups: liberal Western-trained academics and the
internationally-oriented business community. Proponents essentially believe that China should deepen its integration
with the international community in both security and economic spheres.
“The world today, compared to the 19th and 20th centuries, has become more organised,” said Harding. Countries,
even the most powerful ones, need to fit into existing international systems before they can effect changes that
they want. “This school of thought not only thinks that this integrative approach is necessary, but some are quite
confident that this will also be in China’s interest,” said Harding. Their strongest argument is that China’s economy,
liberalised just over 30 years ago under Deng Xiaoping’s watch, has benefited tremendously from integration. China’s
membership into international institutions like the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, for example, has
helped accelerate its economic growth over the past decade.
What this integrative tendency means for US-China relations is that China will adopt a more co-operative policy
against America. The understanding is that both countries are now in the same “great powers” league, but while
there is competition to some degree, they share a bigger common interest in the proper functioning of international
institutions. “’We are all in it together, we are all in the same boat’,” described Harding.
This tendency, of course, dovetails nicely with the aspect of American policy that is geared towards encouraging
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greater integration of China into the international order, which implies – from the American perspective – a more
predictable and responsible China.
Defensive: Don’t interfere; don’t cause trouble for us
The second tendency, “defensive”, is what Harding sees as presently dominant within China’s civilian leadership. This
is a school of thought that is extremely concerned about China’s domestic problems, and worries that certain issues
may be seized upon by external opponents to destabilise China. While human rights is the perennial favourite, the
headline hogging issue last year was China’s currency, the RMB.
Many developed Western economies, and even Brazil, were calling for China to appreciate the value of the RMB as
they lament their trade deficits with China. The call was repeated during Hu’s recent state visit to America. “There is
a suspicion that ‘they are doing it precisely to cause trouble for us, so we have to defend ourselves against this’,”
said Harding.
In this tendency, the typical, miffed response from China would be along the lines, “don’t interfere in our internal
affairs; you are trying to be subversive”. Such reaction led many outside China to think that Chinese leaders are
being excessively defensive. “On the other hand, who would know better than they themselves what is the sum
total of all the challenges that they face?” asked Harding.
So even as Americans remain frustrated that Chinese are not doing what they want them to do – open up certain
sectors of the economy, let the RMB appreciate and so on – proponents of this tendency want China to dig in and
keep its deflective wall up.
Assertive: China is rising; it’s time for you to accommodate us
The third and last tendency, “assertiveness”, has been getting a lot of press over the past year. It is founded on
the premise that as a result of the relative decline of old powers like Europe, Japan and America, China’s time has
come. Even as the developed world struggles to recover from the 2008-2009 economic crisis, China has maintained
steady economic growth. More so, even as other armed forces had to cut spending, the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) continues to enjoy a budget growing at double-digit rates.
“China has achieved advances in both civilian and military technology far faster than anybody has expected. I can
now begin a file of clippings, organised around the theme ‘earlier than expected’,” said Harding, referring to a growing
list of tangible advancements made or poised to be made by the Chinese: world’s fastest supercomputer, a new
anti-ship ballistic missile system, an operational aircraft carrier and of course, most notably, the J-20 stealth fighter
plane that was purportedly capable only of runway tests – until Gates arrived in Beijing.
Naturally, the growing confidence over these achievements, combined with the perception that the West is in
decline, has led to a school of thought that says “it is now time for China to renegotiate a variety of arrangements
that it was forced to accept in an earlier balance of power, but no longer necessarily that China will tolerate,” said
Harding. The proponents of this assertive tendency would have the following list of demands: stop selling arms to
Taiwan, stop meeting the Dalai Lama, stop undertaking reconnaissance patrols near the Chinese coast, stop
embargoing arms sales to China. The balance of power is changing, the proponents of this third tendency argue, and
therefore, the pattern of China’s relationship with the major powers has to change accordingly.
Quite clearly, the PLA is the core base behind this assertive tendency. However, what is of growing concern is the
extent to which the military is independent from civilian control, and that includes Hu’s denial that he knew about
the J-20 test flight, just when Gates was in town. “The list of things that the civilian leadership allegedly did not
know: selling missiles to Saudi Arabia, how the military managed the EP-3 incident in 2001, and so on – that could be
the second file clipping, which will go back even earlier than the file on ‘faster than expected’,” said Harding.
As the PLA increasingly adopts a more aggressive posture especially in the past year, they have no lack of
cheerleaders in the form of thousands, if not millions of young Chinese not shy at all about expressing their
nationalistic fervour both on and offline.
Harding recalls sitting in a talk at a Chinese university delivered by a senior Chinese diplomat some years back. The
official gave a very balanced presentation, in which he argued that it was important for China to understand, and in
some ways, accommodate American demands, since the relationship with the United States was so important to
China.
“When he finished his presentation, the first question from the floor was: ‘When are we Chinese going to stop
responding to what the Americans ask of us and start making our own demands on them?’ “The whole crowd burst
into wild applause,” said Harding. The message from this group of future elites of China: ‘That was then, this is now,
time for a different relationship’. And that view, already evident then, is even more prominent today.
2012 is not 1976
To be sure, these three tendencies appear to represent – and they are – distinct differences. However, lest one
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starts to draw deeper into ancient Chinese history and expect the country to fall back into the cycle of internal
conflicts and unification, this will not be so.
“These are not diametrically opposing tendencies,” said Harding. Just over three decades ago, when China was
coming out of the post-Mao (and post Cultural Revolution) era, Deng Xiaoping was up against the incumbent Gang of
Four, with totally different visions of how China should evolve “It was a life and death struggle, literally, not
figuratively. You needed a showdown to resolve it,” said Harding.
In contrast, even as different interest groups jostle, China today is decidedly more moderate and more consensual.
Referring to the three incidents that drew international attention all within that one-week period: the RMB, Ai’s
studio and the J-20 – what is happening and will happen, according to Harding, are relative shifts in the balance as
various interest groups press for their desired policies in tandem with changes in the international environment.
None of the tendencies can eliminate the others at this point, but the balance among them can change from year to
year. 2008 was largely defensive, as no one wanted anything to go wrong for the Beijing Olympics, 2009 was
perhaps more integrative, whereas 2010 was certainly more assertive.
Chinese succession: routinised; American election: never mind
The key question that remains is where Xi and his 2012 team might lean. How will the balance shift? From Harding’s
point of view, not that much. “My gut instinct is that this is by now a ‘routinised’ process.” Ever since the Jiang
Zemin era two generations before Xi’s fifth, the pattern of China’s leadership succession has by now pretty much
set: the previous generation would decide the team taking over from the current leadership, who, in turn, would
chose the subsequent team – giving both China and the world at least five years in which to observe the next team
of Zhongnanhai occupants.
“Elite politics in China is a system that doesn’t want surprises. What may cause a change in the balance among the
three tendencies is a change in the domestic or international environment than in the choice of leadership. So
change, if any, is a little bit more of this and a little bit less of that, rather anything more fundamental,” said
Harding.
For America, the level of noise and number of possibilities leading up to 2012 is seemingly higher. Firstly, Obama
might win his second term; the Republicans might take back the White House; or a challenger might even emerge
from among the Democrats. The polarising Sarah Palin, John McCain’s running mate for 2008, has already implied that
she is considering running. “Even if Palin gets elected, after we get through the first few months, things will probably
settle down,” said Harding, to some laughter from the audience.  At least that has been the pattern of the past, in
which Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush first promised, then abandoned, tougher policies toward
China.
The same tendency analysis can be applied to America too, but the way Harding puts it, the most likely outcome is
the continuation of the dominant “mainstream policy” with two tendencies of its own: integration plus hedging. “On
one hand, engage China bilaterally, encourage its integration with the international communities, but on the other
hand, hedge against this possibility that this might fail,” he said.
Just as in China, there will be changes in the balance between these two tendencies, but not seismic shifts. “Just
like any policy that walks on two legs, the relative weight will shift from time to time, but no clear alternative has
begun to emerge. Almost all the critics are still talking within this framework. Right now, they are calling for a little
more balancing, a little more hedging. But so far there is no fundamental alternative to this mainstream policy has
emerged,” said Harding.  
Size and choices
Regardless of what kind of tendencies both sides are developing, there is a common denominator: a mutual
recognition that a longer term shift in the balance of power is starting to occur. “No matter which strategy,
integrative, defensive or assertive, I see virtually all the politically active in China are envisioning that China’s time
has come -- if not globally at least regionally,” he said. The time has come, so the thinking goes, for China to
reclaim its traditional position at the centre of the region. “I think all Chinese think that this is something that should
happen and is going to happen.”
At the same time, having played the central and dominant role in world politics for the last century, and having won
the Cold War against the Soviets, Americans are not about to just pack up its bases in South Korea and Japan, and
stay behind the International Date Line. “Most people in the United States think that they should remain as the
paramount power in Asia, for as long as China does not share more political values with the United States. And even
then, a democratic China might be difficult for Americans to accept as the successor in playing the dominant role in
Asia,” said Harding.
As a result, the competition and tension will still go on between the two countries. Hu’s recent state visit has not
resulted in any significant breakthroughs. He made the courteous gesture of professing recognition for the
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universality of human rights, on top of the usual inking of commercial deals – worth US$47 billion this time round --
to keep American factories running.
What really matters and will influence actions taken by both countries, will be more of economic factors, and less of
who the leaders are. On one hand, China, even as it enjoys economic growth (a higher-than-expected 9.8% in the
fourth quarter last year), is suffering from high inflation, which is tipped by Citigroup and Credit Suisse economists to
hit 6% later this year. This is a worry that outweighs other problems like corruption, human rights, or even the
melamine milk scandal.
“So far, we have not seen protests that the regime cannot deal with. However, inflation would be an issue that is
extremely difficult to contain,” said Harding. But if severe economic problems should produce higher levels of dissent,
Harding predicted that this would be more likely to strengthen the defensive tendency than the assertive one.
For America, the possibility of a sluggish economic recovery, or worse, a double-dip recession, coupled with the
dissatisfaction over China’s micro-steps over the RMB, would likely lead to a less accommodative policy toward
China. But the focus would be on economic protectionism, rather than geopolitical containment. 
At the end of the day, how much foreign policy wiggle room the leaders of these two economic giants can have, is
pretty much determined by these kinds of structural factors. “The importance of domestic leadership is a function of
the size of the country. Little countries have no choice, big countries have choices. But, I am not sure how much of
a choice even big countries like America and China can have, for the choices are very much structured by the
domestic situation and international balance,” said Harding.
Regardless of what they do, and how much they do, the rest of the world will be paying attention.
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